We build an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility choices as well as public and private expenditures on health. We find that the complementary effect of public health services on private health expenditures can provide an additional explanation behind a salient feature of demographic transition; that is, the fertility decline along the process of economic growth.
Introduction
In a seminal paper, Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) analyse a growth model in which public health spending is complementary to the expenditures that individuals incur for the improvement of their health status. They find that an increase in the public provision of health services induces individuals to reduce their saving and, correspondingly, 2 increase the resources they devote towards health improvements. As a result, the dynamics of capital intensity become non-monotonic and may admit periodic (endogenous limit cycles) or even aperiodic (i.e., chaotic) equilibria.
In this paper, we build an overlapping generations model in which individuals live for three periods -childhood, young adulthood and old adulthood. Our model utilises the main idea of Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) -that is, public health spending being complementary to private health spending -but modifies their set-up in the following manner. Firstly, we allow individuals to consume during both periods of their adulthood.
Secondly, individuals incur their health expenditure during the final period of their lifetime. Finally, we assume that individuals are reproductive during their young adulthood and they choose the number of their offspring in an optimal fashion.
Our results can be summarised as follows. We find that, rather than generating a trade-off between saving and private health spending, the provision of public health services induces an increase in both private health spending and saving; therefore, the dynamics of capital accumulation are monotonic and endogenous fluctuations cannot emerge. Furthermore, by motivating individuals to save more, the complementary nature of public and private health expenditures also induces them to bear and raise fewer children during their young adulthood. Hence, this complementarity emerges as an additional explanatory factor behind a well-known stylised fact of demographic transition (e.g., Dyson and Murphy, 1985) . 1 
The Economy
Time is discrete and indexed by 0,1,... t . We consider an economy which produces a homogeneous commodity and is inhabited by reproductive individuals who live for three periods and belong to overlapping generations. Agents make decisions only after they reach their adulthood. These decisions are dictated by the desire to maximise their lifetime utility function
subject to the constraints x is the old adult's spending towards health improvements. When young, each person is endowed with a unit of time which she allocates between raising children and providing labour services. Raising each child requires q units of time. Therefore, the young adult will use her remaining time to earn labour income -an income that is subject to a flat tax rate τ . She divides her disposable income between consumption and saving. The latter is deposited to a financial intermediary with the purpose of providing the agent with retirement income when she becomes an old adult. When old, the agent can potentially face some health problems which she can tackle by using part of her retirement income for the improvement of her health status. The remaining part of retirement income is used so as to satisfy her consumption needs.
With respect to the link between public and private health expenditures, we follow Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) in using the expression in (4) for which it is assumed that N is meant to capture a congestion-type effect. In particular, those who are young in period t will access public health services when they become old, i.e., in period 1 t . We assume that, for given 1 t g , a larger population of agents mitigates the benefit accrued to each agent.
Given the above, the assumptions illustrated through (4), (5) and (6) provide a mechanism through which the provision of public health services is complementary to 2 
i.e, the elasticity of health status with respect to private health spending is increasing to the stock of public capital that the government devotes towards health services.
In Frankel (1962) and Romer (1986) , we assume that is related to the average capital-labour ratio according to a learning-by-doing externality. That is
Firms who maximise profits will equate the marginal product of each input with the respective marginal cost. That is,
and 11 ()
Equilibrium
After some straightforward algebra, the first order conditions associated with an agent's optimal problem allow us to derive the following conditions for saving, fertility and private health expenditures: 
Combining (16) with (5) and (6) 
Discussion
We have established a new mechanism in explaining a salient feature of demographic transition. In particular, the decline of fertility during the process of growth is attributed to the complementary effect of public health spending on private health expendituresan effect that has been introduced in the manner of the seminal analysis of Bhattacharya and Qiao (2007) (see equations (4)- (7)). As the economy grows, the public capital available for health services increases and improves the effectiveness of private health expenditures. Old adults will find that it is optimal for them to increase the resources they devote towards the improvement of their health status. In order to ensure the availability of these resources, they reduce their expenditures when young in order to save more. Given that childrearing costs are among these expenditures, reproductive young adults will reduce the number of children they give birth to. Consequently, the fertility rate declines.
